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Abstract
This article discusses the different understandings of the meaning of the precautionary principle as a means to cope with public health risks. The article reviews the position of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (“EC”) on this principle to assess whether, and to what
extent, the EC’s position conforms to the limits imposed by World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
law. I will examine whether the precautionary principle, as interpreted by the EC, is reconcilable
with the WTO agreements and forms part of WTO law. As it stands now, other WTO members
are well advised to take a cautious stance on the EC’s perspective of the precautionary principle.
Otherwise, the communication might turn out to be a ”Trojan horse.”

PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND
THE ROLE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE UNDER WTO LAW: A TROJAN
HORSE BEFORE GENEVA'S WALLS?
Dr. Hans-JoachimPriess & Dr. ChristianPitschas*
INTRODUCTION
Public health is a value of eminent importance. This has
long been acknowledged by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 19941 ("GATT") and European Community ("Community" or "EC") law alike. One striking example of this is the
exceptions provided in Article XX(b) of GATT 2 and Article 30 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"),' both of which justify quantitative restrictions on the
trade in goods and measures having an equivalent effect if necessary for the protection of public health. The European Court of
Justice (or "ECJ") has rendered a number of decisions that upheld national measures affecting intra-Community trade because
they were deemed to be necessary to protect public health.4 A
World Trade Organization 5 ("WTO") panel recently issued a re* Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Berlin/Brussels (hans-joachim.priess@
freshfields.com; christian.pitschas@freshfields.com). The authors would like to thank
Ms Kristina Jonek for her help in the preparation of this Essay.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finale.htm [hereinafter GATT].
2. Id. art. XX(b).
3. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C. 224/1(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L. 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R.741 [hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C 340/1(1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, O.J. C 340/3(1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty],
incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
4. See, e.g., Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission, Case C-320/93, [1994] E.C.R. I20.
5243,
5. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
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port on the compatibility of a French ban on the import of asbestos products with WTO law.' The panel for the first time in
the history of GATT/WTO under the exception clause of Article
XX(b) of GATT 7 recognized the necessity of this measure to protect public health.
Increasingly, the public is exposed to health risks that are
generated by new scientific developments. One example is genetically modified organisms, the use of which in the area of agriculture and the food industry has sparked a fierce debate.8
The emergence of such risks begs the question of how to deal
with them.9 One suggestion, which is strongly favored by the EC,
is to rely on the precautionary principle as a legal means to cope
with these risks, whether it be in the field of international law or
Community law. This principle made its first appearance in the
area of environmental protection,' but some also now consider
it to form part of other areas, such as the protection of human
health. There are, however, different understandings of the
meaning of the precautionary principle. Internationally, this
principle essentially relates to a scientific uncertainty regarding
the existence or seriousness of a risk. According to the proponents of this view, a precautionary approach requires taking
measures designed to prevent such a risk from coming into exisOF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
6. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos And Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Asbestos Case].
7. See GATT art. XX(b).
8. The recently signed Protocol on Biosafety intends to regulate trade with genetically modified organisms. See European Report No. 2471, Feb. 2, 2000, at 10-11; see also
BULL. QUOTIDIEN EUR. No. 7645, Feb. 1, 2000, at 12 (noting that EC Commissioner
Margot Wallstr6m, responsible for environment, hailed this event as "a historic moment
and a breakthrough for international agreements on trade and the environment").
9. See Horst G. Krenzler & Anne MacGregor, GM Food: The Next Major Transatlantic
Trade War?, 5 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW, 287 (2000); Sara Pardo Quintillan,
Free Trade, Public Health Protection and Consumer Information in the European and WTO Context, 33J. WORLD TRADE 147, 176-87 (1999). The EC Economic and Social Committee
points out in its opinion on "Use of the precautionary principle" that "risk acceptability
requires new types of rules ... In western culture, the emergence of the risk concept
testifies to a profound change in the relationship with danger." See Opinion of the
Economic and Social Committee on the Use of the Precautionary Principle, para. 2.1,
2000 O.J. C. 268/6.
10. G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 21, at (I)(21) U.N. Doc.
A/RES/37/7 (1982) (referring to this principle for first time in so-called World Charter for Nature) [hereinafter World Nature Charter].
STRUMENTS-RESULTS
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tence or from becoming serious, thereby protecting the environment and public health.
The EC especially has been advocating this principle in the
international arena, in general, and in the WTO, in particular.
The EC relied on this principle in EC Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones)," and it recently submitted a communication on the very same principle to the WTO Committee
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. The Commission also
published a communication on the precautionary principle
("EC's Communication") at the beginning of this year, and the
Council issued a resolution on the precautionary principle at the
Nice summit. 12 'Given the considerable weight of the EC within
the international community and its undeniable importance for
the proper functioning of the world trading system, it appears to
be appropriate to review the position of the EC on this principle
and to assess whether, and to what extent, its position conforms
to the limits imposed by WTO law. Irrespective of the opinion of
the ECJ that WTO law cannot be invoked directly in the Community legal order, 3 the EC cannot deviate from the obligations
that it has assumed in the context of the WTO. Commissioner
Pascal Lamy, responsible for the external trade relations of the
EC, has reiterated his call for a rule-based system more than
once. 4 Against this background, the question needs to be asked
whether the precautionary principle, as interpreted by the EC, is
reconcilable with the WTO agreements and forms part of WTO
law.

11. WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products(Hormones), Report from the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R
(Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones Case].
12. Communication on the PrecautionaryPrinciple, Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, COM(2000)1 final (Feb. 2, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/healthsconsumer/precaution.htm [hereinafter EC's Comrnunication]. Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, BULL. QUOTIrDIEN EuR.
No. 7860, Dec. 10, 2000, at 14-17. The Council resolution endorses "the broad lines" of
the EC's Communication. Id., para. 1.
13. Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union, Case C-149/96 [1999]
E.C.R. 1-8395, para. 36-48.
14. See Pascal Lamy, Challenges Confronting the World Trade System Today, EUR. FoREIGN AFF. REv., Nov. 8, 2000, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/speeches-articles/
spla36 en.htm.; see also Pascal Lamy, Fairetomber les barriersne suffira pas, Market Access
Conference, Brussels (Nov. 28, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/
speeches.articles/spla23_fr.htm.
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I. THE EC'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The EC's perspective on the precautionary principle recently was summarized by the EC's Communication.1 5 First, the
EC's Communication takes into account the legal sources at the
Community and international level and concludes that (i) this
principle is a "general one,"" as far as Community law is concerned and (ii) it has become "a full-fledged and general principle of international law."' 7 Second, the EC's Communication
describes the constituent parts of the precautionary principle as
perceived by the Commission. In this respect, the Commission
considers that the application of the precautionary principle "is
part of risk management, when scientific uncertainty precludes a
full assessment of the risk and when decision-makers consider
that the chosen level of environmental protection or of human,
animal and plant health may be in jeopardy." 8 Third, the EC's
Communication identifies general principles for the application
of the precautionary principle. 9
A. Legal Basis of the PrecautionaryPrinciple
1. Community Law
The Commission refers to two Judgements in particular to
support its position: one from the European Court ofJustice (or
"ECJ") and one from the Court of First Instance. The ECJ ruled
on the legality of the Commission's decision that temporarily
banned the export of all bovine animals and all beef and veal or
derived products from the UK to other EC Member States or to
15. EC's Communication, supra note 12. For a recent discussion of the precautionary principle in the Community context, see Hans-Werner Rengeling, Bedeutung
und Anwendbarkeit des Vorsorgeprinzips im Europiiischen Umweltrecht, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLAr, 1473-1478 (2000).
16. See TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAw 32-38 (1999) (describing the status and role of general principles within Community legal order).
17. EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 3-4. The Council is somewhat more
cautious in its resolution, stating that the precautionary principle is "gradually asserting
itself as a principle of international law in the fields of environmental and health protection." Id. para. 3.
18. EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 5.
19. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6; see also Council Resolution,
supra note 12, para. 17-20. These principles include proportionality,'non-discrimination, consistency, a benefit/cost analysis, and the examination of scientific developments. Id.
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third countries, on the premise that a risk of transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ("BSE") to humans could not
be excluded. 2° The English National Farmers' Union challenged the decision of the Commission, arguing, inter alia, that
it breaches the principle of proportionality. The ECJ rejected
this argument. The ECJ acknowledged that the principle of proportionality mandates that recourse must be to the least onerous
measure when there is a choice between several appropriate
measures and the disadvantages caused by the recourse must not
be disproportionate to the aims pursued. 2 1 The ECJ, however,
held that "[w] here there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent. "22
The Court of First Instance ruled on the application for interim relief against the withdrawal of an antibiotic from the list
of authorized feedingstuffs. 2' The Court dismissed the application by relying on the above-cited statement of the ECJ. Moreover, it noted that "[t]here can be no question but that the requirements of the protection of public24 health must take precedence over economic considerations.
It is interesting to note that the ECJ made this statement in
connection with the principle of proportionality. Although the
ECJ relied on Article 174(2) of the EC Treaty to justify its approach, it refrained from invoking the precautionary principle.
Instead, the ECJ relied on the principle of "preventive action."
Irrespective of the relationship between these two principles,25
20. The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Commissioners of
Customs & Excise, ex parte National Farmer's Union, David Burnett and Sons Ltd, R.S.
Case C-157/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2211 [hereinafter Fisheries Case].
21. Id. para. 60.
22. Id. para. 63. The Court reiterated this statement in United Kingdom of Great
Britian and Northern Ireland v. Commission of the European Communities, Case C180/96 [1998] E.C.R. 1-2265 para. 99 [hereinafter UK. Case].
23. Alpharma Inc. v. Council of the European Union, Case T-70/99 R, [1999]
E.C.R. 11-2027.
24. Id. para. 3. This statement was reiterated in Pfizer Animal Health SA/NV v.
Council of the European Union, Case T-13/99R, [1999] E.C.R. 11-1961 para. 171. In
this respect, the Court relied, inter alia, on ajudgment of the European Court ofJustice
("ECJ"). See Affish BV v. Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees, Case 183/95,
[1997] E.C.R. 1-4315 para. 43.
25. Article 174(2) speaks of the precautionary principle and of the principle "that
preventive action should be taken." A textual interpretation therefore indicates that

524

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:519

the aforementioned statement of the ECJ is nonetheless significant with respect to the precautionary principle. The ECJ holds
that "protective measures" may be taken in situations where the
existence or extent of risks to human health is uncertain. Scientific uncertainty that precludes a full assessment of risk is one of
the prerequisites for the precautionary principle to apply. By establishing a link between scientific uncertainty, on the one hand,
and preventive measures in reaction to such uncertainty, on the
other, the ECJ seems to have acknowledged that the precautionary principle forms part of Community law in the area of public
health.
The ECJ's statement, however, is inconclusive with respect
to the content and scope of the precautionary principle. First,
scientific uncertainty poses two questions: whether something
needs to be done to protect against a feared risk and what conditions must be met before any action is taken. Scientific uncertainty, however, does not answer these questions.2 6 Second, the
ECJ's belief that protective measures may be taken without waiting until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully
apparent is not entirely satisfactory. Provided that the existence
or extent of risks is uncertain, it is unclear whether the perceived
risk is real and, if so, whether it is serious. The assumption underlying the ECJ's statement, however, appears to be that further
scientific evaluation of the risk in question will reveal that it is
real and/or serious. 27 This assumption, however, presupposes
both principles have different functions. Some commentators believe that the principle of preventive action is designed to avoid (imminent) dangers, whereas the precautionary principle aims to reduce risks so that no danger will appear. See CHRISTIAN
CALLIES & MArHIAS RUFFERT, KOMMENTAR zu EU-VERTRAG UND EG-VERTRAG art. 174,
para. 28-30 (1999). Nonetheless, it is also argued that both principles may overlap to
some degree in a given case. See SIEGFRIED BREIER & HENDRIK VYGEN, LENZ, EG-VERTRAG, KOMMENTAR art. 174, para. 13 (2d ed. 1999).

26. Admittedly, the Court recognized the following in its judgment:
The decision was adopted as an emergency measure 'temporarily' banning
exports... Moreover, the Commission acknowledges in the preamble to the
decision the need for the significance of the new information and the measures to be taken to be subjected to detailed scientific study and, consequently,
the need to review the contested decision following an overall examination of
the situation ....
Fisheries Case para. 65.; see also UK. Case para. 101. This seems to imply that protective
measures are subject to at least three conditions: (i) they may only be taken on a provisional basis, (ii) the scientific evaluation of the situation must continue, and (iii) the
provisional measures must be reviewed in the light of new scientific evidence.
27. This assumption is expressed even more clearly in Jan H. Jans, Communication
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what still needs to be established.
Contrary to the ECJ's judgment, the aforementioned order
of the Court of First Instance referred specifically to the precautionary principle, which was invoked by the applicant. The
broad statement that the requirements of the protection of public health must take precedence over economic considerations,
therefore, must be seen in this context. This axiomatic statement implies and presupposes a high level of protection of public health, but, as noted before, whether this protection demands recourse to the precautionary principle is by no means a
foregone conclusion. Hence, the said statement of the Court of
First Instance does not shed more light on the content and
scope of the precautionary principle than that of the ECJ, since
it does not clarify under which circumstances it is justified to
take preventive measures, based upon a precautionary approach.
In light of the above, the Commission's claim that the case
law confirms the status of the precautionary principle as a general principle in Community law must be viewed with caution.
The case law indicates that this principle does exist. Furthermore, the case law supports the Commission's assertion that the
precautionary principle extends to the protection of human
health as well. One can deduce from the case law also that the
precautionary principle may apply in situations when it cannot
be established with sufficient certainty that there is a risk to
human health or, if there is a risk, that it is serious. The case
law, however, is rather vague concerning the content and scope
of the precautionary principle and the conditions for its application. The case law does not precisely specify (i) under which
circumstances this principle applies and (ii) which steps must be
respected when applying this principle. 2' Therefore, one cannot
help but agree with the following statement of the Economic
and Social Committee expressed in its opinion on the use of the
precautionary principle:
At the European level, the Economic and Social Committee
notes that there are as yet few legal bases for a precautionary
on the PrecautionaryPrinciple: Is It Really Necessary?, 27

LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION

115, 115 (2000) (stating that "[i] t means that if there is a strong suspicion that a certain
activity may have harmful consequences, it is better to act before it is too late rather
than wait until scientific evidence is available which incontrovertibly shows the causal
connection").
28. See Rengeling, supra note 15, at 1477-1478.
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principle and that case law is still in its infancy. Explicit and
implicit allusion to this principle does not provide a solid
base, and the Economic and Social Committee would2 9 ask the
Commission to submit a concrete, viable case soon.
2. International Law
Even though the precautionary principle had been mentioned in the so-called World Nature Charter of 198230 and twice
in non-binding declarations relating to the protection of the
North Sea, 3 ' it only became prominent upon conclusion of the
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992.32 The precautionary principle was embodied in
principle 15 of the so-called Rio-Declaration (or "Declaration")
in the following terms: "In order to protect the environment,
the precautionary approach should be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation."
Although principle 15 uses the word "shall" in the second
sentence, thereby seemingly indicating a mandatory force of the
precautionary approach, two factors militate strongly against
such a mandatory force. First, the aforementioned principle
uses the word "should" and restricts the application of the precautionary principle to the "capabilities" of the States. Thus, no
real obligation is imposed on the States. Second, principle 15 is
part of the Rio-Declaration. The latter is not a binding treaty,
but a non-binding declaration that recites some guidelines that
the States participating in the Rio-Conference consider helpful,
but not necessarily mandatory, in resolving environmental
problems. Also, the participation of numerous States in the Rio
29. Use of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, Own-Initiative Opinion of the Economic and
Social Committee para. 4.1.1-.2, at http://www.ces.eu.int/en/docs/frdocs-opJuly.
htm [hereinafter Opinion].
30. See generally, World Nature Charter, supra note 10.
31. See Ministerial Declarationof the Second InternationalConference on the Protection of
the North Sea (Nov. 1987), at http://odin.dep.no/md/html/conf/declaration/
london.html; see also MinisterialDeclarationof the Third InternationalConference on the Protection of the North Sea (Mar. 1990), at http://odin.dep.no/md/html/conf/declaration/
hague.html.
32. Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR A/
CONF.125/126 (1992).
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conference, thus supporting the Rio-Declaration, does not qualify the Declaration as international customary law. This could
only be assumed if the Declaration was merely declaratory,
merely restating norms of customary international law. This,
however, is not the case, since the precautionary approach was a
rather new concept at the time of the Rio-Conference. Therefore, this Declaration can only be seen, if at all, as a starting
point for the evolution of international customary law.33
Since the Rio-Declaration, the precautionary principle has
made its way into several international conventions on the protection of the environment. Most of these treaties, however, do
not oblige their parties to adhere to the principle. Rather, the
principle is framed in non-binding terms. For example, the
principle is contained in the Preamble of the 1992 Convention
on Biological Diversity.34 The Preamble, in part, states that "lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat." 5
The Preamble resembles principle 15 of the Rio-Declaration, and again the word "should," instead of "shall," is used.
Moreover, a Preamble usually does not include obligations for
the contracting parties. Rather, the Preamble may play a role
when interpreting specific treaty obligations in their context
with the rest of the treaty.3 6 The principle is also contained in
Article 3 of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate
Change.3 7 As far as the precautionary principle is concerned,
however, this provision is framed in a way that makes it quite
clear that the principle is non-mandatory, as evidenced by the
use of the word "should" throughout the text of this provision.
On the other hand, there are examples where the precautionary principle has been phrased in strict terms. Article
33. See 1 R. JENNINGS & A. WATTs, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 16 (9th ed.
1996) (discussing contribution of declarations of international bodies to crystallization
of customary international law).
34. Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl. (June 5, 1992), available at http://
www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/cdbtexte.pdf.
35. Id.
36. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(2), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For an example of such an interpretation see United States- Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Case].
37. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, (May 9, 1992), available at
http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/conv_005.html.
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2(2) (a) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic3" refers to the precautionary principle and speaks of preventive measures that "are to
be taken." More recently, Article 10(6) of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in part, states:
[L]ack of scientific information and knowledge regarding the
extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks
to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a
in order to avoid or minimize
decision, as appropriate . . . 39
such potential adverse effects.

Do these examples sufficiently establish the precautionary
principle as "a full-fledged and general principle of international
law," as asserted by the Commission in its EC's Communication?
It is submitted that this is not the case.4 ° First, the notion "principle" is somewhat vague. Admittedly, it has been used by many
to an almost inflationary extent in the context of international
law. In accordance with Article 38(1) (c) of the ICJ-Statute, however, one can speak of a general principle of (international) law
only if it can be derived from the municipal laws of different

38. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic art. 2(2)(a) (Sept. 22, 1992), available at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html.
39. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http.www.jiwlp.
com/contents/Cartagena-Protocol.htm. The so-called Miami group (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, United States, and Uruguay) had opposed the incorporation of
this principle into the protocol, demanding that decisions should be based on established scientific evidence, see EURO. REP., No. 2470, Jan. 29, 2000, at 13. It is believed
that the application of the precautionary principle as regards trade in genetically modified organisms on the basis of the Cartagena protocol-once it has entered into forcewill be tested in the WATTO forum, due to the unclear relationship between the protocol
and the SPS Agreement. See Biosafety ProtocolAgreed in Montreal, but Does it Provoke More
Questions Than Answers for Potential Trade Disputes, WORLD TRADE AGENDA, Feb. 14, 2000,
at 7-9; see also Barbara Eggers & Ruth Mackenzie, The CartagenaProtocol On Biosafety, 3J.
INT'L ECON. L. 539-40 (2000); Peter W.B. Phillips & William A. Kerr, Alternative Paradigns, The W17O Versus the Biosafety Protocolfor Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms, 34J.
WORLD TRADE 63 (2000); Fiona MacMillan & Michael Blakeney, Regulating GMOs: Is the
Wl1O Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Hormonally Challenged?,4 INT. T. L.
R. 131 (2000).
40. See US Challenges Europe's Food Safety Stance, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000 (stating
that the United States also challenged the Commission's claim in response to the EC's
Communication).
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legal systems. 41 The Commission did not demonstrate in its
Communication that the precautionary principle can be distilled
from the municipal laws of different legal systems as a general
principle.
The only remaining possibility, therefore, is that the principle may have obtained the status of international customary law.
Pursuant to Article 38(1) (b) of the ICJ-Statute, customary international law is established by two requirements: (i) the actual
behavior of states and (ii) the belief that such behavior is legally
required (opino iuris).42 The fact that some of the aforementioned treaties attach mandatory force to this principle is not sufficient to conclude that the principle has in the meantime acquired the status of customary international nature. As the ICJ
highlighted in its decision on the North Sea ContinentalShelf, such
a process is perfectly possible and does occur from time to
time.4 3 The ICJ, however, also stressed that this process has several preconditions: (i) the provision must be of a fundamentally
norm-creating character, (ii) participation in the convention in
question must be widespread and representative, and (iii) there
must be State practice, including that of States whose interests
are specially affected. This State practice must confirm the content of the invoked provision and must be extensive and virtually
uniform.4 4 Regardless of whether the first two requirements are
met, the third certainly is not as far as the precautionary principle is concerned. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Commission did not attempt to show in its Communication that these
conditions were met with respect to the precautionary principle.
Therefore, all that can be said with respect to this principle at
the present state of international law is that it has acquired the
status of soft, but not of hard law.4 5
LAW 16 (5th ed. 1998);
383-84 (3rd ed. 1984).
42. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (4th ed. 1997).
43. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3 para. 71.
44. Id. para. 73-74.
45. Brownlie, supra note 41, at 285-86 (speaking of "emergent legal principle").
Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, in his book VOLKERRECHT (1997), rejects the idea that the
precautionary principle may have obtained the character of customary international
law. Id. at 487-88. See also Hormones Casepara. 123. The Appellate Body in the Hormones
Case stated:
The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a
general principle of customary environmental law. Whether it has been widely
accepted by Members as a principle of general customary internationallaw ap-

41.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

VERDROSS & SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES V6LKERRECHT
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B. Triggering Factors and Application of the PrecautionaryPrinciple
The Commission identifies the following constituent parts
of the precautionary principle and establishes guidelines for its
application.
1. Precautionary Principle as Part of Risk Management
The Commission notes that the precautionary principle is
relevant only in the event of a potential risk.4 6 Thus, recourse to
the precautionary principle presupposes (i) identification of potentially negative effects resulting from a phenomenon, product,
or procedure and, subsequently, (ii) a scientific evaluation of the
risk that is as objective and complete as possible.4 7 Recourse is
available under the precautionary principle only if it is impossible to determine with sufficient certainty the risk in question
due to the insufficient, inconclusive, or imprecise data. In this
respect, the Commission notes that the absence of scientific
proof of the existence of a cause-effect relationship, a quantifiable dose/response relationship, or a quantitative evaluation of
the probability of the emergence of adverse effects following exposure should not be used to justify inaction.48
The Commission, therefore, maintains that the precautionary principle is not part of the risk assessment, which is an integral part of the scientific evaluation. 4 9 Rather, according to the
Commission, the precautionary principle is part of risk management when scientific uncertainty precludes a full assessment of
the risk and decision-makers find that environmental protection
pears less than clear.... We note... that the precautionary principle, at least
outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative
formulation.
Id.
The Appellate Body also noted that the ICJ, in its judgment in the Case Concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Sept. 25 1997), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ins/ihsjudgment/ihsjudg.html, did not identify the precautionary principle as one of the new norms in the area of environmental protection referred
to by the ICJ. Id. para. 123, n.93.
46. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 5.1.
47. See id. para. 5.1.3, 6.1.
48. See id. para. 6.2.
49. The EC intends to set up an independent food authority that would be entrusted with the task of risk assessment in this area. See BULL. QUOTIDIEN EUR., No.
7678, Mar. 17, 2000, at 9.
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or human, animal, and plant health may be injeopardy.5 ° Thus,
the Commission finds that relying on the precautionary principle is the result of "an eminently political decision, a function of
the risk level that is 'acceptable' to the society on which the risk
is imposed."5
At this point, three preliminary observations can be made.
First, the Commission tries to draw a clear line between risk assessment, on the one hand, and risk management, on the other.
Whereas risk assessment is a scientific evaluation that so-called
risk evaluators-scientists-must make; risk management, which
is not a scientific evaluation, is the responsibility of risk managers-decision-makers. By distinguishing between these two responsibilities, the Commission attempts to attribute a broad discretionary power to the community institutions whenever they
act as risk managers.5 2 This is clear from its statement that any
judicial review of precautionary measures must be limited to examining whether the Community institutions committed a manifest error, misuse of power, or manifestly exceeded the limits of
their power of appraisal.53
Second, the Commission asserts that the Community is entitled to prescribe the level of protection, notably with regards to
the environment and human, animal, and plant health that it
considers appropriate. 4 Hence, the choice of the desired level
of protection is a political decision as well.
Consequently, if the precautionary principle is invoked, two
political decisions-the level of protection and the measures
necessary to achieve this level-are intertwined. This environment might lead to a situation in which arbitrary decisions are
50. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 5. This is also the position of the
EC Economic and Social Committee.
51. EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 5.2.1. The Council takes the same
view in its resolution, supra note 12, para. 12.
52. This is also the opinion of Steven Milloy, who argues that "despite the various
conditions outlined in the EU's position, EU members will ultimately be able to have
unfettered discretion over how they interpret the guidelines." See Steven Milloy, European Caution Carries Risks, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at 11.
53. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 5.2.2. This terminology has already been used to limit the judicial review by the Court of Justice and the Court of
First Instance in trade policy disputes. Cf. NMB France Sarl v. Commission, Case T162/94, [1996] E.C.R. 11456, para. 71 & 73; see also Sinochem National Chemicals v.
Council, Case T-97/95, [1998] E.C.R. 11-85 para. 51.
54. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 4; see also EC Economic and
Social Committee, supra note 29, para. 4.1.7. & 5.4. (concurring with this view).
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made 5 that purport to protect public health but whose real aim
is to protect domestic industries against competition from
outside.56 The Commission seems to be aware of this danger,5"
since it highlights that "the precautionary principle can under
no circumstances be used to justify the adoption of arbitrary de-

cisions."5 8 It, therefore, sets out certain guidelines for the application of the precautionary principle at the second stage, the
stage of risk management. These guidelines are dealt with
later.5, 9
Third, the Commission does not clarify the level of uncertainty that must prevail to adopt a precautionary approach (i.e.,
what degree of probability of a risk must exist in order to justify
preventive measures). It simply says that the potential consequences of inaction and the uncertainties of the scientific evaluation should be considered by decision-makers when determining
whether to take action.60 However, in order to determine
whether the risk exceeds the chosen level of protection, the likelihood that this event may occur needs to be established. The
more likely it is that the chosen level of protection will be undermined, the more it seems reasonable to resort to preventive action. 6 The Commission, however, refrains from addressing this
55. See Arguments Continue to Rage Over EU's Use of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,'EURO.
VOICE, Apr. 2000, at 13-19.
56. See Milloy, supra note 52, at 11. The author rightly fears that the precautionary
principle will be used as a pretext for blocking new technologies and restricting trade.
Id. In his view, "[t]he guidelines allow EU member countries to contain economic risks
from trade, rather than risks to public health and safety." Id. By the same token, there
is legitimate concern that the incorporation of the precautionary principle in the Biosafety Protocol opens up a loophole for protectionism. See Caution Needed, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 5, 2000.
57. The day after the communication was published, Commissioner Margot Wallstr6m, responsible for the environment, sought to dispel suspicions that the EU is inclined to use the precautionary approach as a means to protect business. See Mike
Smith, PrecautionaryPrincipleIs Not Protectionist, Brussels Insists, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000.
She said that the EU needed to ensure a high level of protection for humans, health
and plant life and for the environment. Id. She later on reiterated this position. See
BULL. QUOTIDIEN EUR., No. 7689, Apr. 1, 2000, at 7.
58. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 5.1.
59. See Natalie McNelis, EU Communication On The PrecautionaryPrinciple, 3 J. INT.
ECON. L., 545, 549 (2000) (claiming that these principles do not place meaningful constraints on application of precautionary principle).
60. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6.2.
61. SeeJans, supra note 27, at 115. This also seems to be the underlying assumption of the call for a "strong suspicion that a certain activity may have harmful consequences." Id.
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topic in more detail.6 2 On the one hand, it states that recourse
to the precautionary principle is justified when scientific uncertainty precludes a full assessment of the risk. This could mean
that the danger for the chosen level of protection must be more
likely to occur than not. On the other hand, the Commission
notes that the views of a minority fraction of the scientific.community should be considered, provided the credibility and reputation of this fraction are recognized.6 3 This could mean that a
lesser degree of likelihood could be sufficient to trigger preventive measures.6 4
2. Limits for the Application of the Precautionary Principle
The Commission recognized that there are certain limits for
the use of the precautionary principle, stating that "reliance on
the precautionary principle is no excuse for derogating from the
general principles of risk management."6 5 These principles of
risk management are proportionality, non-discrimination, consistency, cost/benefit analysis, and examination of scientific developments.6 6
The principle of proportionality demands that risk reduction measures should include less restrictive alternatives that
make it possible to achieve an equivalent level of protection, and
the measures must not aim at zero risk. A total ban, therefore,
may not be a proportional measure in a given situation, whilst in
other cases it may be the sole response to a potential risk. With
respect to the principle of non-discrimination, the Commission
stresses that preventive measures should neither invoke the geographical origin, nor the nature of the production process. With
regards to the principle of consistency, the Commission emphasizes that protective measures should be comparable in nature
and scope with measures already taken in equivalent areas in
which all scientific data are available (i.e., where there is no sci62. Milloy, supra note 52, at 11 (noting that "precisely how much and what type of
scientific evidence is needed to comply with the principle remains unclear"); see also
McNelis, supra note 59, at 550.
63. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6.2.
64. The EC Economic and Social Committee notes in its opinion that "the precautionary principle must be invoked and applied all the more frequently, not least in cases
where the risk is not directly perceptible." See Opinion, supra note 29 para. 8.2 (emphasis added).
65. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6.3.
66. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6.3.1-.5.
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entific uncertainty). Moreover, the Commission believes that an
examination of the benefits and costs of action, including noneconomic considerations, and the lack of action must be undertaken. Furthermore, the Commission notes that preventive measures should be subjected to regular scientific monitoring, so
that they can be reevaluated in light of new scientific information.
Finally, the Commission addresses the issue of the burden
of proof.6" The Commission holds that recourse to the precautionary principle may require shifting the burden of proof to the
producer or importer, although it admits that such a reversal of
the burden of proof cannot be systematically maintained as a
general principle. Such a general reversal of the burden of
proof would possibly run counter to the fundamental rights that
must be respected at the Community level.68
II. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND WTO LAW
The Commission asserts that its Communication does not
evade obligations arising from the WTO agreements. It emphasizes that the envisioned use of this principle complies with these
obligations.6 9 According to the Commission, a WTO member is
entitled to determine the level of environmental or health protection that it deems appropriate and, therefore, may apply precautionary measures that lead to a higher level of protection
than provided for in the relevant international standards or recommendations. 70 According to the Commission, Article 5(7) of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures 71 ("SPS Agreement") clearly sanctions the use of the
precautionary principle. 72 The Commission adds that the precautionary principle must be duly addressed at the international
67. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6.4.
68. See Rengeling, supra note 15, at 1479-1480.
69. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 2. Some commentators understand this message to mean that "the Community has not accepted defeat in the Hormones debate yet!" SeeJans, supra note 27, at 117.
70. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 4.
71. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/finale.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
72. EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 4. The Council observes in its resolution that "WTO rules do basically allow account to be taken of the precautionary
principle," supra note 12, para. 4.
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role in international law, notably in
level because of its growing
73
the WTO agreements.
As evidenced from this statement, the Commission wants to
transpose the precautionary principle, as defined in its Communication, to the level of WTO law, in particular the SPS Agreement. The Commission asserts that this is compatible with the
standards set by the relevant WTO agreements. This assertion is
questionable.
A. The Place of the PrecautionaryPrinciple in WTO Law
Article XX(b) of GATT and the SPS Agreement are the primary instruments that protect public health within the WTO
framework. 4

Both shall be examined to determine whether

they accommodate the precautionary principle.
1. Article XX(b) of GATT
a. Double Standard: Chapeau and Particular Exception
Article XX of GATT is the general exception clause to the
obligations contained in GATT. 5 It enables WTO members to
deviate from the rules of GATT, in particular those involving the
most-favored nation obligation, the national treatment obligation, and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions, provided
that certain requirements of public interest are met. The life
and health of humans, animals, and plants are some of the public interests sought to be protected.76
Article XX(b) of GATT sets forth two standards, both of
which must be satisfied by a national measure adopted by a WTO
73. EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 4.
74. For a discussion of other WTO agreements relating to the protection of public
health, especially the TBT Agreement, see Carlos M. Correa, Implementing National Public Health Policies in the Framework of WTO Agreements, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 89, 97-108
(2000).
75. GATT art. XX.
76. Article XX(b) of GATT with the pertinent part of the introductory clause of
Article XX reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
...(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
Id. art. XX(b).
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member. This has been explained by the Appellate Body as follows:
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be
extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come
under one or another of the particular exceptionsparagraphs (a) to (j)-listed under Article XX; it must also
satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of
Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first,
provisional justification by reason of characterization of the
measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the7 same
7
measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.
In the case of Article XX(b) of GATT, this'two-tiered approach has the following consequences: first, it must be determined whether the national measure concerned is "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health." If this is the
case-and only if this is the case-it must next be established
whether the national measure at issue (i) arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates between countries where the same conditions
prevail or (ii) constitutes a disguised restriction on international
trade. In this respect, it has to be pointed out that the introductory clause of Article XX of GATT, the so-called. "chapeau," does
not really address the questioned measure or its specific contents
as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied.78
Irrespective of the fact that Article XX(b) of GATT does not
mention the precautionary principle and assuming for a moment that Article XX(b) of GATT does not hinder the precautionary principle, recourse to this principle by a WTO member,
such as the EC, when having resort to a protective measure,
could have implications for both the particular exception in paragraph (b) and the introductory clause of Article XX of GATT.
Nonetheless, if the application of the precautionary principle in
a specific instance pays tribute to the principles outlined by the
EC's Communication, in particular the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination, which are intended to prevent an
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or "disguised restriction on international trade," the use of the precautionary princi77. United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Case]; see also
Shrimp Case para. 118-19.
78. Gasoline Case, at 22; Shrimp Case para. 115.
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ple is more likely to be a matter of the particular exception in
paragraph (b) of Article XX of GATT. A WTO member taking
protective measures that are inspired by a precautionary approach would primarily have to demonstrate that these measures
are indeed "necessary to protect human . . . health. 7 9

b. The Asbestos Case and its Significance for the
Precautionary Principle
The Asbestos Case sheds some light on the question of
whether Article XX(b) of GATT actually allows a WTO member
to invoke the precautionary principle, although the EC did not
expressly rely on this principle in the case. The Asbestos Case involved a French regulation that prohibits the production, marketing, importation, and exportation of all varieties of asbestos
fibers or any product containing asbestos fibers for public health
reasons. Canada exported more than two-thirds of France's
needs for a specific asbestos fiber, chrysotile fiber. Canada maintained that the ban violated WTO rules. The panel concluded
that the French ban was contrary to Article 111(4) of GATT. 0 It,
therefore, examined whether the French measure was consistent
with Article XX(b) of GATT. Whereas the EC argued that asbestos fibers and products containing such fibers are a proven hazard for human health, Canada contended that chrysotile fiber
enclosed in a matrix of high-density cement does not constitute
a detectable risk to human health.8 1 There was thus disagreement as to the existence of a risk.
The panel noted that paragraph (b) of Article XX of GATT
implies the existence of a health risk.8 2 It then turned to the
criterion of "necessity" and noted that previous panels had concentrated on the question of whether there were alternative
79. Gasoline Case, at 22-23. As was noted by the Appellate Body with respect to the
burden of proof in United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Shirts and Blouses
ftom India, Panel Report, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997):
The burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending,
who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defense. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true,
the burden shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption.
Id.
80. Id. para. 8.158.
81. Id. para. 8.162-.164.
82. Id. para. 8.170.
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measures consistent or less inconsistent with GATT, in the light

of the health objective pursued. 3 In these instances, however,
the parties to the dispute agreed on the existence, and extent, of
the health problem associated with the product in question. By
contrast, in the Asbestos Case, the panel faced a situation where
the parties did not agree on the existence of a risk to human
health. Therefore, the panel considered it appropriate to examine first whether chrysotile fibre and chrysotile-cement pose a
risk to human health and, provided that there is one, whether
the measure was necessary to contain this risk.8 4 Before embarking on this exercise, though, the panel emphasized that it would
not call into question the level of protection that France wishes
to achieve, as it had long been established that WTO members
are free to set the level of protection of their choice for their
populations.8 5
i. Sufficient Scientific Evidence for the Existence of a Risk to

Human Health
The Asbestos Case panel stressed that its role was to determine whether there is sufficient scientific evidence to conclude
that there exists a risk to human health.8 6 In this respect, the
panel noted that the carcinogenicity of chrysotile fibers had
83. Id. para. 8.172. The panel cited the report Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Panel Report, DS1O/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990)
para. 75. Already in United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the panel
held:
[A] GATT Contracting Party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as 'necessary' in terms of Article XX ... if an alternative
measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not
inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token,
in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a Contracting Party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with
other GATT provisions.
See Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36S/345, para. 5.27 (amended 1989); see also Correa, supra
note 74, at 96. Correa criticizes that:
[T]he exception under Article XX(b) of the GATT, as interpreted, has in
practice left States with little room to design and implement public health
measures... [t]here is no room for national autonomy in determining what
the adequate public health measures are. The application of the 'necessary'
test limits the options available to the States.
Id.
84. See Asbestos Case para. 8.175 - 8.176.
85. Id. para. 8.179.
86. Id. para. 8.182.
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been acknowledged for some time by international bodies and
that experts consulted by the panel confirmed this view.8 7 It
thus concluded that it had sufficient evidence for the existence
of a risk to human health associated with the inhalation of chrysotile fibers. With regards to chrysotile encapsulated in a cement
matrix, the panel noted that the evidence "tends to show that
handling of chrysotile-cement products also constitutes a risk to
health rather than the opposite. '"88 Consequently, the panel
concluded that the EC established a prima facie case for the existence of a health risk in connection with the use of chrysotile
and that Canada had not presented evidence to rebut this find89
ing.
Already this starting point of the panel's examination of the
French import ban for asbestos fibres shows that the precautionary principle is not applicable in the context of Article XX(b) of
GATT, at least not with regard to the initial question of whether
a measure for which Article XX(b) of GATT is invoked falls
within the range of policies designed to protect human health.
This result occurs because the precautionary principle is relevant only if there is scientific uncertainty concerning the existence or seriousness of a risk. The panel made it quite clear,
however, that Article XX(b) of GATT requires sufficient evidence of a risk.
The opposite could be true only if the principles on risk
assessment embodied in the SPS Agreement, in particular in Article 5 (7), also were applicable in the context of Article XX(b) of
GATT. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the panel
explicitly refrained from relying on the SPS Agreement, despite
the fact that recital 8 of the Preamble to the SPS Agreement expressly refers to Article XX(b) of GATT and states that the provisions of the SPS Agreement elaborate on the former. The panel
said that the Appellate Body also had not sought to extend the
principles of the SPS Agreement to the examination of the measures for which Article XX(b) had been invoked.9"
This approach is legally sound. The panel rightly noted
that the SPS Agreement contained "more detailed provisions"
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.

8.188.
8.193.
8.194.
8.180.
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than Article XX of GATT.9 1 Moreover, the Appellate Body acknowledged in European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas '9 2 that whenever GATT
and another agreement in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement
appear to apply to a measure in question, this measure should
be examined on the basis of the agreement that "deals specifically, and in detail," with measures of this kind.9" However, as
far as the relationship between Article XX(b) of GATT and the
SPS Agreement is concerned, it must be pointed out that, pursuant to Article 1 (1) of the SPS Agreement, the latter applies only
to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as defined in Annex A to
the SPS Agreement. Since the French measure is not a sanitary
or phytosanitary measure within the meaning of the SPS Agreement, Article XX(b) of GATT was applicable to this measure.
ii. Necessary for the Protection of Human Health
Canada argued that there are alternatives less inconsistent
with GATT than the import ban. Controlled use based on international standards would be such a measure. Although the EC
did not dispute this, the EC felt that controlled use would not
allow France to achieve its public health objectives. The panel
did not object to this line of reasoning. It reiterated that it could
not question France's objective and further stated that controlled use based on international standards would not make it
possible to achieve the French objective. 4 The panel, in part,
concluded: "We therefore find that a decision-maker responsible for establishing a health policy might have reasonable doubts
about the possibility of ensuring the achievement of France's
health policy objectives by relying on controlled use . ...""
Does this open the door for the precautionary principle?
Undoubtedly, we are faced with the question of risk management that is portrayed by the EC Commission as the right place
for the application of the precautionary principle. Also, the EC
Commission pointed to the relationship between a high level of
protection and the precautionary principle. Nonetheless, we are
91. Id.
92. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
93. Id. para. 204.
94. Asbestos Case para. 8.210.
95. Id. para. 8.211.
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not confronted with the usual situation of the application of the
precautionary principle by decision-makers. In such a situation,
it is unclear whether the chosen level of protection is at risk due
to insufficient, inconclusive, or imprecise information. The
French decision-makers were not faced with such a situation. Instead, they had sufficient information that asbestos fibres, including chrysotile fibre and products containing it, pose a risk to
public health. Therefore, they had to decide which protective
measure would reduce or eliminate this established risk as much
as possible. The question is then whether the decision-maker in
question should have had recourse to an alternative measure. In
order to answer this question properly, the panel examined
whether controlled use as an alternative measure is "sufficiently
effective in the light of France's health policy objectives." 6 In
other words, the panel sought to determine whether France reasonably possessed other measures that were less trade restrictive,
but as effective as the import ban with respect to the chosen level
of protection.9 7 This determination is part of the principle of
proportionality, even though the panel did not expressly refer to
this principle. This principle also is relied upon by the ECJ
when considering whether a measure of a EC Member State that
restricts intra-Community trade in goods is justified by Article 30
of the EC Treaty, a provision whose structure is copied from that
of Article XX(b) of GATT. 98
c. Conclusion
The panel report in the Asbestos Case demonstrates that the
precautionary principle has no place in the context of Article
XX(b) of GATT. This provision requires the establishment of
sufficient scientific evidence that the relevant policy objectives,
96. Id. para. 8.208.
97. Admittedly, the principle of proportionality is said to also determine the application of the precautionary principle. The Commission stresses that "risk reduction
measures should include less restrictive alternatives which make it possible to achieve
an equivalent level of protection." See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6.3.1.
Nonetheless, the principle of proportionality would then be resorted to on the basis of
evidence insufficient to determine with certainty the existence of a risk, i.e., as an element of the precautionary principle, as opposed to a situation-which is present in the
Asbestos Case-where there is sufficient information on the existence of risk and thus no
uncertainty. In the latter case, the principle of proportionality stands on its own.
Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of
98. See, e.g.,
Germany, Case 274/87, [1989] E.C.R. 229, para. 6.
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such as human health, are at risk. This differs from the triggering factor of the precautionary principle, which is thought to be
scientific uncertainty. For the same reason, the examination of
whether a WTO member's measure is necessary to protect the
policy objectives, such as human health, in accordance with the
chosen level of protection does not leave room for the precautionary principle either. This is because the search for alternative measures that are equally effective in reducing or eliminating the established risk is guided by the principle of proportionality-not as part of the precautionary principle, but in its own
right.
2. SPS Agreement
a. Use of Harmonized Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
The SPS Agreement deals with sanitary and phytosanitary
measures ("SPS measures"), as defined in Annex A, which may,
directly or indirectly, affect international trade.99 Its intention is
to create, as far as possible, an equilibrium between the need to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health, on the one hand,
and the desire to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory interference in the trade of goods, on the other. To achieve this result,
the SPS Agreement emphasizes the use of harmonized SPS measures, based on international standards, guidelines, and recommendations developed by relevant international organizations
(e.g., the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization). Article 3(1) of the SPS Agreement, therefore, calls on the WTO members to have recourse to such international standards, guidelines, and recommendations, without
implying that these international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are obligatory.1 0° If the WTO members base
their SPS measures on these standards, they benefit from a presumption, albeit rebuttable, that their measures are in line with
the SPS Agreement, pursuant to its Article 3(2)." °
Nonetheless, the WTO members are entitled to determine
the level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection that they deem
99. See Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the Wl'Os Sanitary and Phytosanitay
Agreement: The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89, 112-13 (1998) (explaining this two-part test).
100. See Hormones Case para. 165.
101. Id. para. 170.
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appropriate, even if this level exceeds the level that would be
achieved by measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines, and recommendations. This freedom, however, is not unlimited. In the Hormones Case, which concerned
an EC prohibition of the sale and import of meat and meat
products derived from cattle to which certain kinds of natural or
synthetic hormones had been administered for growth promotion purposes,' ° 2 the Appellate Body underlined that "the right
of a Member to define its appropriate level of protection is not
...

an absolute or unqualified right."1 3

Article 3(3) of the SPS Agreement makes the determination
of a higher national level of protection subject to the following
condition: there must be a scientific justification for such a determination, or the determination must be made in accordance
with Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. The distinction made between a scientific justification and a risk assessment according to
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement is difficult to grasp, 0 4 since all
measures that are not based on international standards must be
consistent with any other provision of the SPS Agreement, pursuant to Article 3(3). As the Appellate Body pointed out in the
Hormones Case, any other provision of the SPS Agreement also
includes Article 5.105 Regardless of whether the distinction in
Article 3(3) of the SPS Agreement is more apparent than real,
the WTO members do not enjoy unfettered discretion when deciding on the level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection.'0 6
They have to107abide by the rules specified in Article 5 of the SPS
Agreement.

See Quintillan, supra note 9, at 156-59 (explaining background of this case).
See Hormones Case para. 173.
See McNiel, supra note 100, at 124.
See Hormones Case para. 175.
Olivier Blin, La Politique Sanitairede la Communautd Europdenne d l'6preuve des
l'OrganisationMondiale du Commerce: Le Contentieux des Hormones, 35 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPIEN 43, 54 (1999).
107. Correa, supra note 74, at 100. The author believes that "the room for manoeuvre of national policies under the SPS Agreement is more limited than under the
GATI'." Id. He thus concludes that "how to secure that the exercise of the sovereign
rights of States to adopt public health and other policies is not unduly limited by the
application of trade disciplines, is still an open issue that is central to future deliberations within the WTO." Id. at 112.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
Rgles de
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b. Risk Assessment and Cases of Insufficient
Scientific Evidence
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement centers on the notion of risk
assessment, which is defined in Annex A of the SPS Agreement.1 ° s This provision requests that WTO members base their
SPS measures on a risk assessment, taking into account, inter
alia, available scientific evidence, on the one hand, and the objective of minimizing negative trade effects, on the other. The
scientific evidence used must be sufficient to establish a risk.
This can be inferred from Article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement,
which requires that an SPS measure is not maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence, and-argumentum a contraio-Arti-

cle 5(7) of the SPS Agreement, which refers to the situation
"where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient."' 0 9 The risk
assessment, however, must not establish a minimum magnitude
of risk." 0 Rather, in the words of the Appellate Body in the Hormones Case,
Article 5.1, when contextually read as it should be, in conjunction with and as informed by Article 2.2. of the SPS
Agreement, requires that the results of the risk assessment
must sufficiently warrant-that is to say, reasonably supportthe SPS measure at stake. The requirement that an SPS measure be "based on" a risk assessment is a substantive requirement that there be a rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment.1 1'
108. SPS Agreement art. 5. According to Paragraph 4 of this Annex, risk assessment is the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment, or spread of a pest or
disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or
phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects
on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or foodstuffs. Id. para. 4.
109. Id. art. 5(7). Article 5(7) reads in full:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the
sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of
time.
Id.
110. Hormones Case para. 186-87.
111. Id. para. 193 (emphasis added); see also McNiel, supra note 100, at 118 (re-
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This finding is not without implication for Article 5(7) of
the SPS Agreement. This provision is intended to deal with cases
where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, thereby referring to 'the situation that justifies the application of the precautionary principle. 1 2 The Appellate Body underlined in JapanMeasures Affecting AgriculturalProducts (" Varietals Case") that Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement operated as a "qualified" exemption from the obligation under Article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific
evidence and that an overly broad and flexible interpretation of
would render Article 5(7) SPS Agreement
that latter obligation
"meaningless.""' 3 Accordingly, the EC feels that the concept of
risk assessment in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement as interpreted
by the Appellate Body leaves leeway to determine the appropriate basis for a precautionary approach."a 4 The Appellate Body
noted in the Hormones Case that the precautionary principle is
reflected in recital six of the Preamble and Article 3(3) and Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement. 115 Nonetheless, the Appellate
Body stressed that "the principle has not been written into the
SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are
otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in
particular provisions of that Agreement." 116
Hence, the application of the precautionary principle must
be consistent with the SPS Agreement (i.e., the principle may
marking that the approach of the Appellate Body "clearly indicate(s) that a WTO member maintaining a purported SPS measure must be able to adduce evidence that prominent scientists would accept as scientific"). But see Ryan David Thomas, Where's the Beef.
Mad Cows and the Blight of the SPS Agreement, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 487, 507 (1999)
(alleging that "this creates an environment where a Member could fabricate a satisfac-

tory response to these 'minimal' procedural requirements which is merely a pretext for
a disguised restriction on international trade, yet still have 'based" their measure on a
'risk assessment' in the context of the Agreement"). See also Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20,

1998) [hereinafter Salmon Case] (stating that "for a risk assessment to fall within the
meaning of Article 5.1 and the first definition in paragraph 4 of Annex A, it is not
sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is a possibility of entry, establishment
or spread of diseases and associated biological and economic consequences").
112. See Thomas, supra note 111, at 504; see also Guide to the Uruguay Round

Agreements (1999), at 63.
113. Japan-MeasuresAffecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) para. 80 [hereinafter Varietals Case].
114. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 4.
115. See Hormones Case para. 124; Varietals Case para. 81.

116. See Hormones Case para. 124; see also Thomas, supra note 111, at 498-99.
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not be invoked as a justification for noncompliance with the provisions of the SPS Agreement). This observation is not overridden by the finding of the Appellate Body that the SPS Agreement does not distinguish between risk assessment and risk management, since the concept of risk management had been used
by the panel to sustain a more restrictive interpretation of risk
assessment than results from a reading of Article 5(2), Article 8,
and Annex C to the SPS Agreement.1 1 7
In light of the above, the requirements of Article 5(7) of the
SPS Agreement must be examined in order to determine the
extent to which the precautionary principle may be relied upon
by a VTO member. Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement does not
relieve a WTO member from the duty to base its SPS measures
on a risk assessment, whether the Member State, another WTO
member, or an international organization conducted the risk assessment."1 8 This understanding is confirmed by the second sentence of this provision, which demands that "a more objective
assessment of risk" is undertaken once there is additional information. A more objective risk assessment presupposes that there
has already been a prior risk assessment. This is acknowledged
by the Commission in its Communication, stating that a precautionary SPS measure must include an evaluation of risk.1 19
In this respect, one must note that the words "more objective assessment" cannot be interpreted to mean that the initial
risk assessment can be carried out in a non-objective or-as suggested by the Commission-in a less objective way.1 20 Instead,
this risk assessment must be as objective as possible. The fact
that scientific evidence is insufficient does not modify the manner in which the risk assessment is carried out. This is supported
by the requirement in Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement that
the risk assessment must be based on available pertinent information, including that from relevant international organizations
and other WTO members. Thus, the WTO member assessing
the risk is under the duty to collect as much information on the
risk as possible, so that the SPS measure has a scientific basis as
broad as possible.
117. Hormones Case para. 181 & 206.
118. Id. para. 190.
119. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 4.
120. Id. This contradicts paragraph 6.1 of the EC's Communication, where the
Commission calls for a scientific evaluation as objective and complete as possible.
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As stipulated in Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement, the duty
to collect pertinent information continues to exist after the SPS
measure has been implemented. 21 This is because a risk assessment on the basis of insufficient scientific evidence is necessarily
incomplete. Therefore, as soon as more information is available,
a new risk assessment, which takes the additional information
into account, must be carried out. This is explicitly provided for
in Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement. As the new risk assessment benefits from a broader scientific basis than the previous
one, it is more objective (i.e., more complete, than the first risk
assessment). The consequence of a more objective risk assessment is a necessity of review of the SPS measure in question.
This is also explicitly stipulated in Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement. Such a review is only meaningful if it leads to a withdrawal
or modification of the measure concerned, provided the new
risk assessment reveals that there is no risk or that the level of
risk is either higher or lower than formerly established. Therefore, any SPS measure taken on the basis of Article 5(7) of the
SPS Agreement is provisional only.
Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement demands that the SPS
measure in question be reviewed within a reasonable period of
time. The reasonableness of this period of time cannot be determined in the abstract, as pointed out by the Commission. 122 The
WTO member, however, is under an obligation to make reasonable efforts to obtain additional information as soon as possible to
be able to make a more objective risk assessment which will allow
to review the SPS measure. This has been confirmed by the
panel and the Appellate Body reports in the Varietals Case.
Since a risk assessment also is required in cases where the
scientific evidence is insufficient, there must inevitably be a "rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment." Whereas the results of a risk assessment in accordance
with Article 5 (1) of the SPS Agreement must sufficiently warrant
121. In the Varietals Case, the Appellate Body held that "the information sought
must be germane to conducting such a risk assessment, i.e., the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of, in casu, pest, according to the SPS measure
which might be applied." Id. para. 92.
122. See EC's Communication, supra note 12, para. 6.3.5. In the Varietals Case, the
Appellate Body stated that "what constitutes a 'reasonable period of time' has to be
established on a case-by-case basis and depends on the specific circumstances of each
case, including the difficulty of obtaining the additional information necessary for the
review and the characteristics of the provisional SPS measure." Id. para. 93.
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the SPS measure in question, the initial risk assessment in the
cases referred to by Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement cannot
produce such results, because there is insufficient scientific evidence. Rather, the risk assessment-albeit on the basis of insufficient scientific evidence-must show a prima facie case for a
risk. Otherwise, the required rational relationship does not exist.
Furthermore, the provisional SPS measure that is taken pursuant to an initial risk assessment on the basis of insufficient scientific evidence must observe the limits imposed by Article 5(5)
of the SPS Agreement. The WTO member must avoid making
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protections
it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. According to the Appellate Body, a violation
of Article 5(5) of the SPS Agreement is presumed if (i) certain
levels of protection are adopted in different situations, (ii) there
is arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in the treatment of these
situations, and (iii) there is discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade resulting from the application of the measure embodying or implementing the level of protection. 123 The Appellate Body added that the situations, albeit different, must be
comparable (i.e., they must have some common elements), since
a total difference would preclude a rational comparison. 124 Furthermore, the Appellate Body stressed that the standards of the
chapeau of Article XX of GATT could not be casually imported
into Article 5(5) of the SPS Agreement due to the structural differences between the two.
Moreover, the SPS measure adopted provisionally on the basis of Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement must abide by Article
5(6) of the SPS Agreement (i.e., it must not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the appropriate level of protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility).
This provision also requires a three-pronged test, as is made
clear by the footnote to Article 5(6) of the SPS Agreement. The
three elements of this test consist of inquiring whether another
SPS measure is (i) reasonably available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility, (ii) achieves the appropriate level
123. Hormones Case para. 214.
124. Id. para. 217.
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of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, and (iii) is significantly
125
less trade restrictive than the SPS measure contested.
c. Communication to the WTO Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
The EU submitted a communication on the precautionary
principle to the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures in March 2000.126 This communication is more or less
the same as the EC's Communication in the preceding month.
This is somewhat surprising, since one would have expected that
the communication submitted to the WTO Committee would
deal more specifically with the relevant WTO agreements, in particular the SPS Agreement, than the EC's Communication. Although the WTO's communication addresses the precautionary
principle also under the angle of WTO law, it does not attempt
to make a thorough analysis of the pertinent reports of the WTO
panels and the Appellate Body and their impact on the application of the precautionary principle in the framework of the
WTO, especially the SPS Agreement. However, only such an effort could initiate a fruitful discussion with other WTO members
on this topic and could be a starting point for a common methodology for the use of the precautionary principle.12 7 Nonetheless, the WTO members welcomed the communication as an attempt to make the discussion on the precautionary principle
more transparent, but expressed their concern that the precautionary principle as envisioned in the communication could
Agreement
weaken the predictability of the provisions of the 1SPS
28
and could be invoked for protectionist reasons.
d. Conclusion
The SPS Agreement clearly differs from Article XX(b) of
GATT: whilst the latter requires sufficient scientific evidence for
a risk, the former specifically addresses a situation of insufficient
scientific evidence in Article 5(7) SPS Agreement. Although the
125. See Salmon Case, supra note 111, at 98.
126. EU White Paper on the PrecautionaryPrinciple,Communication Submitted to the
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/GEN/168 (Mar. 14, 2000).
127. See EUR. REP., No. 2408, May 19, 1999, at 9 (noting that former Commissioner
Sir Leon Brittan had called for development of such common methodology at the first
Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue).
128. See BULL. QUOTIDIEN EUR., No. 7687, 15 (Mar. 30, 2000).
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Appellate Body in the Hormones Case acknowledged that this provision reflects the precautionary principle, it also emphasized
that the precautionary principle could not be invoked as ajustification for not complying with the requirements emanating from
Article 5 SPS Agreement, in particular Article 5(5), 5(6), and
5(7). These requirements are similar to some of the general
principles referred to by the Commission as guiding the application of the precautionary principle. However, these requirements must be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the SPS Agreement in its
context and in the light of its object and purpose. 129 The general principles as outlined by the Commission cannot influence
this interpretation. As the Appellate Body pointed out: "the
precautionary principle does not . . . relieve a panel from the

duty of applying the normal (i.e., customary international law)
principles of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of
the SPS Agreement."'

30

Otherwise, the finely drawn balance between rights and obligations of the WTO members under the SPS Agreement would
be disregarded.
CONCLUSION
The Communication published by the EC Commission in
February 2000, claims, inter alia, that the precautionary principle has become a "full-fledged and general principle of international law." This claim is reiterated in the EC's Communication
to the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
The sources cited by the Commission, however, do not sustain
this claim. The precautionary principle is neither a general principle of law within the meaning of Article 38(1) (c) of the ICJ
Statute, nor a rule of customary international law in the sense of
Article 38(1) (b) ICJ Statute. It, therefore, is not possible, as the
Appellate Body in the Hormones Case made clear, to rely on this
principle in an attempt to override or modify the obligations
stemming from the WTO agreements. Rather, the scope of
these obligations has to be determined in accordance with the
customary international law rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If such
129. See Vienna Convention art. 31(1).
130. Hormones Case para. 124.
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an interpretation reveals that the relevant treaty provisions take
cognizance of the precautionary principle, the latter must of
course be respected, but only to the extent to which it has been
actually laid down in these provisions. This rather straightforward logic tends to get blurred by the communications of the
Community.
The Community points out that the envisioned use of the
precautionary principle is not intended to evade obligations arising from the WTO agreements and insists that this principle
constitutes an essential plank of its policy. Both communications stress that the choices made to this end will affect the EC's
position at international and multilateral level. According to the
communications, these choices are the result of a political decision, "a function of the risk level that is 'acceptable' to the society on which the risk is imposed."13' 1 This political nature is further underlined by the distinction that is drawn by the Community between risk assessment and risk management-recourse to
the precautionary principle is said to be part of the latter. By
characterising the decision on whether or not to act as a political
decision in the context of risk management, the Community attempts to limit the judicial review of such decisions. Pursuant to
the two communications, such judicial review should focus on
whether the institution implementing the measure manifestly
exceed its discretionary powers. Although both communications
only refer to decisions of the ECJ in this respect, the underlying
message is that the WTO dispute settlement organs (i.e., the
panels and the Appellate Body), should also adhere to such judicial restraint.
This point of view is at best partially consistent with pertinent WTO rules, as clarified by panel and Appellate Body reports. Admittedly, it is an autonomous right of each WTO member to determine the level of health protection to be achieved.
This has been explicitly acknowledged by WTO panels and the
Appellate Body. As these bodies have highlighted, however, this
right is not absolute, neither in the context of GATT, nor in the
context of the SPS Agreement. Article XX(b) of GATT and Article 5 of the SPS Agreement both restrict this right. These provisions do not take away the freedom to set the level of health
protection that is deemed appropriate, even if this level of pro131. EC's Communication, supra note 12.
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tection is "zero risk."1 2 However, they restrict the way in which
this level of protection can be achieved, thereby putting constraints on the recourse to the precautionary principle.
The Asbestos Case demonstrates that the particular exception
contained in Article XX(b) of GATT demands sufficient scientific evidence for the existence of a risk, thus excluding the application of the precautionary principle, which only applies in
cases where there is scientific uncertainty. 3 3 Furthermore, the
examination of whether the measure in question is "necessary'
to protect human health under this particular exception also
does not leave room for the precautionary principle, as this examination is essentially influenced by the principle of proportionality. It is submitted that the situation under the TBT Agreement, in particular Article 2(2), is not fundamentally differ13

ent.

4

The Hormones Case has shed light on the situation under the
SPS Agreement. 3 5 The SPS Agreement does not make a distinction between risk assessment and risk management. Rather, to
the extent that these concepts can be distinguished, they are
both encompassed by the SPS Agreement. This, in itself, is no
indication that the precautionary principle is embodied in the
SPS Agreement. But the Appellate Body acknowledged that Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement reflects this principle, since this
provision explicitly recognises that risk assessment can be conducted also "in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient."'" Nonetheless, the Appellate Body rightly emphasised
that this does not justify reliance on this principle to explain
non-compliance with the obligations emanating from Article 5
SPS Agreement, read in conjunction with Article 2 of this agreement.
The specific requirements of Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement have been clarified by the Appellate Body in the Varietals
Case.' 3 7 The SPS measure concerned must be adopted on the
basis of pertinent available information, thereby imposing a duty
on the WTO member in question to collect as much information
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Salmon Case, at 75.
See generally Asbestos Case.
Cf Correa, supra note 74, at 103.
See generally Hormones Case.
Id. para. 17
Varietals Case para. 89.
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as possible before adopting the measures. Although the Varietals
Case did not specifically deal with the risk assessment to be made
on the basis of available pertinent information, it transpires from
the Hormones Case that insufficient scientific evidence does not
relieve a WTO member from showing that there is a rational
relationship between the measure and the risk assessment. Furthermore, the SPS measure must be provisional. The WTO
member concerned is under the obligation to seek to obtain additional information that will enable it to make an even more
objective assessment of the risk, in the light of which the SPS
measure must then be reviewed.
The EC's communications do not attempt to build upon the
reports of the Appellate Body in the Hormones and the Varietals
Cases, insofar as they deal with WTO law. Instead, they only
touch upon these issues in a cursory manner. This is, to say the
least, disappointing. How can the Community seriously expect
other WTO members to enter into a dialogue on the content
and scope of the precautionary principle within the WTO legal
order, if there is no real (i.e., thorough and legally sound), examination of this important issue? As it stands right now, other
WTO members are well advised to take a cautious stance on the
EC's perspective of the precautionary principle. Otherwise, the
communication might turn out to be a "Trojan horse."

